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CONSUMER CREDIT INSURANCE-
A NEED FOR REGULATION IN KENTUCKY
There is no effective regulatory scheme in Kentucky for controlling
consumer credit insurance. The abusive sales practices employed by
creditors and insurers as well as the percentage of premiums retained
by insurers after benefits are paid points out the vital public need for
such regulation. In a recent statistical study the Kentucky Department
of Insurance reported that in 1965, consumer credit insurance sales in
Kentucky produced $10,689,574 in premium payments to insurers, of
which less than forty-six per cent was returned in benefits.' The vast
majority of the balance was profit. While there is no way of knowing
how many policies were sold to unwilling buyers, it has been generally
estimated that abusive selling and rating practices cost Kentucky
debtors $3,000,000 last year.n 2
There has been a rapid growth of consumer credit insurance with
its accompanying abuses since World War II.a Some statutory regula-
tion of consumer credit insurance sold in connection with consumer
loans, small loans, and industrial loans exists;4 however, these statutes
primarily control the credit transaction and not the accompanying
insurance sale. There are no competitive pressures in the credit in-
surance market to help control abusive practices, and the buyer has no
influence on the seller because of the industry's peculiar nature., Ken-
tucky and other states have not enacted adequate controls for con-
sumer credit insurance, or, for that matter, for other fields of in-
surance. Because of this failure, the Senate Judiciary Antitrust Sub-
committee is presently holding hearings to determine if federal con-
trol of insurance should be initiated.
Consumer credit insurance secures specific financial obligations, in-
'Ky. DEP'T o INS., REPORT ON CRHrr INSURANCE 17 (1967) [hereinafter
cited as Ky. REPORT]. The percentage between the total premiums paid and
benefits returned is called the "loss ratio". "Credit insurance is so complicated
that the only reasonable gauge of its cost to insured's is the loss ratio." Sheehan,
Credit Insurance From the Policyholdes Point of View, 16 DIsSErATIoN
A:SmTAcTs 892 (1956).2 Peterson, Credit Life Insurance: Who Should Pay and How Much?,
Louisville Courier-Journal & Times, Sept. 10, 1967, § A, at 1, col 3.8 Total credit life insurance sales increased from $865,000,000 in 1945 to
$62,672,000,000 in 1966. THE INSTImU OF La'm INSURANCE, Tn. LIF IN-
suRANCE FACT Boom 31 (1967).4 Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 291480, 288.560 (1962) [hereinafter cited as IKS].
5 See text at notes 82-84 infra.6 This same committee has previously investigated credit insurance. Sun-
COMMIITTEE ON ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY LEGISLATION OF THE SENATE COm!-
mITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 83rd CONG., 2d Sass., REPORT ON THE TIm-n SALE OF
CREDrr INSURANCE IN CONNECTION Wrr SMA"L LOANS Am OrTE TRANSACIONS(Comm. Print 1955) [hereinafter cited as KANSAS HEARINGS].
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cluding cash loans and credit sales of goods and services.7 against the
debtor's inability to repay his debt due to disability or death.8 The
insurance serves a useful purpose for both creditor and debtor.9 The
creditor benefits by having his debt partially secured and by avoiding
collections or repossessions with their accompanying bad public re-
lations. Moreover, the sale of consumer credit insurance usually pro-
duces additional income for the creditor since he acts as a paid agent
for the insurer. The debtor benefits by having his liability secured in
the event he is unable to repay it because of death or disability.10
There are two types of consumer credit insurance. Term life in-
surance, called consumer credit life, is the most popular." It is written
for the amount of the debt and covers the period of repayment. The
other type, consumer credit accident and health insurance, is less
popular. In Kentucky it accounted for less than fifteen per cent of the
total consumer credit premium earned during 1965.12 Accident and
health premiums are about twice as high as those charged for credit
life. This is because claims occur more frequently, and the detection
7It has been labeled "peace of mind insurance." H. BLACk, Buy Now, PAY
LTra 179 (1961). Consumer credit insurance was created by Arthur J. Morris
in 1917, as a way of securing installment loans under his Morris Plan. See Morris,
The Origin of Credit Life Insurance, 11 PEas. FIN. L. Q. EP'. 129-133 (1957).8 Hereinafter "debt" will include borrower and buyer debt. At the end of
1965, 83% of all consumer installment debts were protected by credit life
insurance. Presently consumer installment debts amount to $68.6 billion; credit
life insurance amounts to $63 billion. The largest single type of installment credit
is on the purchase of automobiles. Other types include personal loans, home
improvements, consumer goods of all description, and a variety of other consumer
installment credit. Banks account for approximately $30 billion of the loans or
44%, while sales finance companies, credit unions, and consumer finance com-
panies collectively issue another $30 billion in credit. Retail outlets account for
about $8.2 billion. Picone, Insurance Today, J. CozumcE, Feb. 16, 1967. See
also THE INsm7'u'r or Lrz INSURANCE, supra note 3, at 31. The average size
credit life policy in force in 1966 was $890.
9 Hereinafter the terms "creditor" and "debtor" will identify the parties
to any non-commercial installment "debt" transaction. "Consumer credit in-
surance" is not to be confused with "credit insurance" bought by creditors as
protection from merehantile loss through inability of commercial business debtors
to pay their obligations. "Credit insurance" is never issued to retail creditors
whose ultimate consumer is the debtor. "Credit insurance" is bought by the
creditor for protection of his own assets, the same as he would buy fire insurance,
"Consumer credit insurance" is bought for the retail installment debtor's protection
from liability and is almost always paid for by the debtor. See 13 G. CoucH
CYcI~oPanrA OF INSURANCE LAw § 48.37 (2d ed. 1965).
10 Over sLty per cent of balances unpaid at death are paid by the debtor's
family. Dunbar, Administrative Rate Fixing on Credit Life, 14 PEns. FIN. L.Q.
RinE. 16 (1959).
11 Consumer credit life insurance will hereinafter be called "credit life."
"Regular life" insurance is all other life insurance except that sold in connection
with a debt as security for default due to death. "Individual credit life" is that
sold to the debtor as opposed to "group" coverage bought by the creditor.
12 Ky. REPoRT 5.
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of fraudulent disability claims requires expensive investigation. 3
Since the same general principles apply to both credit life and credit
accident and health insurance, and the greater abuse is found in credit
life because of its more prominent use, the remaining discussion wNil
focus on credit life.
NATUrE OF CGuEDrr Lm
Credit life insurance policies are tailored to fit the specific needs of
the creditor. In order to lower administrative costs, underwriting re-
quirements are simplified and policy provisions are standardized. Ad-
verse losses causing high premiums and administrative burdens are
kept at a minimum by carefully excluding high risk debtors from
coverage. Individuals known to be in poor health and certain classes of
debtors, such as small loan debtors who have no other security, may
be excluded by the policy. Most policies, whether group or individual,
call for identification of the policy holder, vital statistics, date of loan,
policy amount, premium amount, rate, name of creditor beneficiary,
termination date, and such other information and limitations as are
necessary or desirable to complete the contract.14 Generally there is
a minimum and maximum age limit, but the rate does not vary with
age. Usually no medical examination is necessary, and many policies
have no exclusionary limitations. Although most regular life policies
will not closely approximate the variable and sometimes minimal
amount of the debt, a special feature of credit life is that it can be
written for just this amount. Furthermore, regular life is written for a
longer period of time than the usual debt, though the regular term
life policy may approximate the period of the debt. Credit life, how-
ever, terminates when the debt is liquidated.
Credit life may be level term coverage fixed at the amount of the
original debt for the period of the debt. However, decreasing term
coverage is more readily adaptable to installment repayment. Here the
amount of insurance coverage automatically decreases as the balance
of the debt is decreased by installment repayments, making the in-
surance equal to the unpaid loan balance at all times. When a debt is
repaid by installments, the average debt outstanding over the in-
stallment period is fifty per cent of the original debt. Thus, the
18 To limit minor claims, consumer accident and health insurance is sold in
two ways. One plan has a deductible initial period of time often thirty da
after which the policy operates to assume the debt for the duration of the dis-
ability. The other plan pays retroactively for the total period of disability if
disability exceeds the deductible period. D. KEDZIE, CONSUMER Cpmrr IN-
suRANcE 14 (1957) [hereinafter cited as Km=].
14 3 Ky. ADnw. REG. I-CL&C-1-12 (1955); See also KEmZIE 119-32.
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decreasing term coverage is approximately fifty per cent less than level
term coverage, and it provides a corresponding reduction in premium
costs. Many states, including Kentucky, prohibit coverage exceeding
the debt at any given time.'5
Credit life insurance may be written either on an individual or a
group plan basis.16 Under the individual plan, the debtor purchases
the policy, pays the premium, and either assigns the policy to the
creditor or names him beneficiary. The debtor's estate or a third party
becomes the secondary beneficiary for all proceeds beyond the amount
necessary to satisfy the debt.17 For convenience of the debtor and
creditor most credit life is written by the creditor, wvho has also been
licensed as an agent of the insurer.' s His commission is often as much
as eighty-five per cent of the premium.'0 Although the creditor
handles all administrative matters, including claims adjustment, his
cost in this regard is negligible, having been estimated at less than
five cents per one hundred dollars of coverage.20
The premium is calculated for the total period of the debt and is
paid in a single installment at the time the policy is issued.2' Generally
the premium payment is advanced to the insurer by the creditor who
then adds that amount to the debt to be repaid in installments. If at
any time prior to the maturity date the debt is terminated through
repayment by the debtor, or by operation of the policy, the prorated
unused portion of the premium is refunded to the policy holder or his
heirs.22
Under group policy coverage the creditor is the policy holder and
the beneficiary. He holds a master policy, which remains in effect
indefinitely. Debtors are automatically covered when the debt is in-
curred, and if the debtor dies before repayment the policy settlement
goes to the creditor and must be used to liquidate the debt. The
1GKRS § 304.841 (3) (1962); 3 Ky. ADNuN. REG. I-CL&C-8 (1955).16KRS § 804.841 (1962) provides for group insurance with the creditor
as policy holder. In 1965, credit life premiums earned consisted of 71% group
premiums and 29% individual premiums. Ky. REPORT 12.1744 C.J.S. Insurance § 208 (1945).
18 KRS §§ C04.510-74 (1962) and 3 Ky. ADMIN. REG. I-CL&C-6 (1955)
require that all policies be issued by duly licensed agents. Some creditors sign
the insurer's name, who latter ratifies the contract. Some non-agent creditors send
the policy out to the insurer to be signed.
19 KEnzIz 103.2 0 REPORT OF THE Coi ,rEr To IN VEsTIGATE ALL INSURANCE RATEs AND
PRACTICES CONCERNING CRErr LIFE, CEDrr AccIENT AND HEALTH AND
CREDrr PROPERTY INSURANCE SOLD IN SOUTH CAROLINA 23, 96th Legislature(1965) [hereinafter cited as SoUrH CAROLINA REPORT].
21 KRS § 288.530(10) (1962) allows credit life insurance charges to be a
cost of the small loan.2 2 Kentucky requires the formula used to be filed for approval with the In-
surance Commissioner. 3 Ky. Ar m . REG. I-CL&C-4 (1955). The Rule of 78
is generally followed in determining minimum refund. KEDzi 73-74.
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policy limitations are similar to those in an individual plan. Again the
creditor acts as the insurer's agent, but he does this only for ad-
ministrative purposes since no policies are sold. On group insurance
the creditor's premium may be calculated on the single premium
method also, or it may be determined by the outstanding balance
method. The latter is more popular due to its simplicity. With the
outstanding balance method the creditor pays the premium each
month based on a fixed rate per one thousand dollars of his total debt
outstanding.23 Payments may be absorbed as an overhead cost, or
the debtor's share may be charged to him totally or partially.24
Under a group policy the creditor cannot receive a commission
since he cannot be an agent and policy holder at the same time. This
would constitute an illegal premium rebate as an inducement to
sale.25 However, it is a common practice among consumer credit in-
surers to offer to group policy holders "'premium adjustments' or a
return to the lender policy holder, variously termed a 'retrospective
rate,' 'experience refund,' 'premium refund,' or a "dividend.'  The
payment is based on the mortality experience of a given lender's in-
sured debtors and grows as losses decrease. This "experience refund"
may be refunded as cash or as credit on the creditor's next monthly
premium 27
The refund benefits the insurer with a favorable loss experience
because it creates an incentive for the creditor to select low risk
debtors. Moreover, the risk to the insurer is decreased or eliminated
because premiums are high enough to pay a refund even when the
experience is bad. As a result, to the extent the "experience refund"
is reduced by high losses, the creditor becomes the risk bearer or in-
surer. The named insurer maintains his income, and most of the losses
are paid from the creditor's refund. The retrospective rating system
also affords compensation to the creditor even though he is the policy
holder. Unlike the agent's commission, the refund is calculated and
paid at the end of the fiscal year.28 However, the insurance sale,
23 KEnzaz 122-23. This causes the premium to vary from month to month
according to the creditor's outstanding debt. Id. at 122.
24 KRS § 304.841 (1962); 3 Ky. ADnmm. REG. I-CL&C-5 (1955). Selection
of contribution or non-contribution by the creditor depends upon why he is
providing coverage: to protect his asset, the debt, and provide service for his
customer, or to provide liability insurance to protect the debtor.
25 KRS § 304.932 (1962).
26 See Kxaozm 96-111 where these practices are explained in detail.
27 KRS § 304.865 (1962).
28The fiscal period is limited to one year in Kentucky, ICRS § 304.933(6)
(1962). KRS § 304.865 (1962) prohibits any refund to the creditor of any cost
of coverage over the aggregate contributed by the creditor on regular group life
insurance. Any excess shall be applied for the sole benefit of the debtors. There
is no such limitation on group credit life insurance.
[Vol. 56,
NoTEs
whether individual or group coverage, is in effect an additional in-
come-producing transaction tied in with the credit transaction.29
under any method of compensation, the creditor gains a reward in ad-
dition to security for his credit.
ABUSES
The sale of credit life insurance is highly susceptible to abuse since
it is sold to a captive market,30 the prospective debtor being
"captured" by his need to secure credit. Even if there is a choice of
creditors, the prospective debtor has no bargaining power; he must
accept whatever terms are offered. 31 He can ill afford to criticize a
requirement that he buy credit life insurance under the terms
offered by the creditor. Nor will he be permitted to supply his own
insurance, since this would prevent the creditor from realizing a
financial gain by supplying the insurance. Since he may be able to
pledge full security for the debt, the prospective debtor often does
not want or need the insurance, but he is still required to buy it.
It is in the area of small loans that the greatest abuses are found.
The debtor often is without hard collateral to secure the loan in the
way a chattel mortgage secures a vendor's credit. Credit life insurance
may be required in Kentucky as an express condition of the loan by
small loan and industrial loan companies, and insurance companies
lending money.32 Other types of creditors, not specifically allowed to
require insurance, may, either expressly or by "suggestion," coerce or
intimidate the debtor into buying insurance as a condition precedent
to the extension of credit. His superior bargaining position increases
the temptaton for the unethical creditor to refuse credit unless the
debtor becomes a party to a scheme which will yield the creditor an
extra source of profit in addition to the interest charged for the
credit.
The disparity of bargaining positions also leads to more subtle
forms of coercive selling. The insurance may be added to the debtor's
total obligation without his knowledge.33 Thus, he would be unaware
of his coverage or ensuing rights in case any premium refund is due
29 At least one banker admitted to a Kentucky government official that he
made $50,000 last year on the sale of credit life.
30 Congress found this condition in investigating the need for credit life
regulation in the District of Columbia. H.R. REP. No. 2168, 87th Cong., 2d
Sess. 2 (1962).3 1 See KICzE 40-42- SouTH CAROLINA REPORT 23; H.R. R5$. No. 1782, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1960).
32KRS §§ 288.560, 291.480, 360.030 (1962).
33Noted in President Johnson's speech to Congress regarding the Truth-In-
Lending Act of 1967 as reported in U.S. INvEsToR (April, 1967).
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him.34 Moreover, where the creditor's retrospective rate credit depends
upon his loss experience, claims on the policy may be strictly con-
strued against the debtor's estate. A typical excuse for nonpayment is
that the debtor's pre-existing condition which caused his death bars
payment.
Excessive coverage may be sold on the debt initially by insuring
for more than the debt, or a level term policy may be issued.35 Usually
the creditor has advanced the premium and the debtor must pay
interest rates on this additional debt.a Pyramiding the insurance
policies and thus multiplying the premium cost is another abuse which
is difficult to detect. Often loans are refinanced or renewed, the old
debt being paid off by the greater new loan.37 The insurance policy
on the old debt is cancelled, and a new policy is issued. Pyramiding
occurs when the unearned insurance premium on the old debt is not
refunded and the creditor charges a full premium for the policy issued
on the new loan. Pyramiding is found in states which do not require
refund of all unearned charges upon cancellation of a loan. Also, under
a group policy, when there is no secondary beneficiary, any over-
insurance at the death of the debtor is paid to the creditor even
though the debtor paid the premium.
A startling example of debtor captivity and the abuse of credit life
insurance is shown by the experience of Mr. Cecil G. Husky of North
Carolina. 38 Mr. Huskey attempted to secure a large loan for his home
building business, Husld-Built, Inc. After having been turned down by
several financial concerns, he secured a $33,000 bank loan for his
corporation. As collateral, Huski-Built, Inc. was required to put up
$67,000 worth of first mortgages it held on houses previously sold, and
Mr. and Mrs. Huskey were required to personally guarantee repay-
ment of the loan, although the corporation's financial statement
34 This turns credit life into creditor asset insurance rather than a debtor
liability surety, with the debtor paying for the creditor's protection. KEDZiE 7.
For methods, See H. BLACK, Buy Now, PAY LATm 182 (1962). This practice
is prohibited by 2 Ky. ADmiN. REG. I-CL&C-5 (1955).
35 Where coverage is excessive, there is no insurable interest; the excessive
coverage becomes a wager in violation of usury laws and is prohibited by ICRS §
304.841 (1962); 3 Ky. ADMIN. BEG. I-CL&C-8 (1955).36The Kentucky Insurance Commissioner suggests that it is illegal under
KRS § 304.841 (1962) to insure beyond the amount of the debt, even to cover
finance charges. Ky. REPORT 15.
37 Insurance charges pyramided four times amounted to $678 on a debt of
$2870. In Re Branch, [1966-1967 Transfer Binder] BANcEn. L. REP. 61,943, at
712 481 (E. D. Tenn. 1966). This practice is prohibited in most states; See,
e.g., 3 Ky. ADMN. lEc. I-CL&C-4 (1955). See also KFDzm 2 for a list of other
abuses.3 8 Mr. Huskey testified before the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee in May,
1967. Hearings Bejore the Antitrust and Monopoly Subcomm. Of the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Huskey's Statement].
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showed total assets four times as large as the amount owed the bank.
As Mr. Huskey's business grew so did his need for operating
capital. As a prerequisite to granting the next nine loans, Huski-Built,
Inc. was required to buy credit life insurance at a high premium rate.
The insurance covered Huski-Buil's customers whose mortgages had
been placed with the bank as security.39 The coverage was for the
amount and term of the mortgages, which greatly exceeded the
amount and term of the loans. Huski-Built, Inc. had to pay ten years of
premiums in advance and was not allowed to furnish its own insurance.
No receipts or policies were ever issued by the bank, the bank was the
beneficiary of the policies, and no refund of unused premiums was ever
made when loans were prematurely repaid.
There was a total debt repayment of $249,571. Of this debt,
$28,820 were charges for unneeded, unwanted credit life insurance.40
The bank's explanation of the insurance requirement was that: "We
want to make money, too."41 Mr. Huskey, in explaning his submission
to the demands, stated that:
when one gets caught on a treadmill of need and necessity, you don't
have much choice but to go along with the imposed requirements what-
ever they are. This is what happened to us.... You concede to the un-
necessary terms and unnecessary expense because you need the money.42
This type of experience is found in consumer goods credit transac-
tions as well as lender transactions.
The greatest single abuse and the incentive for all other abuses is
the high premium rate charged for credit life insurance. The creditor's
share is the largest single increment of this premium.43 How important
is the tie-in sale of credit life to the creditor? Two of the largest
independent consumer credit companies, Commercial Credit Corpora-
tion and Associates Investment Company, whose basic business is
lending, report that in 1966 more than fifty per cent of their net in-
come was derived from insurance operations.44 Kentucky statistics
show that in 1955, $9,423,420 in premiums was earned on the sale of
credit life insurance, of which approximately forty-six per cent, or
$4,234,773, was repaid as benefits to debtors.45 Nationally, credit life
returned, in the form of benefits, fifty-three per cent of all premiums
39 The policies were not issued on the life of Mr. Huskey, although he was
the personal guarantor of the loan and the key man in the corporation. Id.
40 See page 676 infra.
41The bank and its officers owned 100% of the insurance company.
Huskey's Statement 8.42 Huskey's Statement 5.
43 Doss, Rate Regulation in Consumer Credit Insurance, 1967 INs. L. J. 9(1967).
44 Ky. REPORT'26.
45 Id. at 4.
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collected.40 This percentage would have returned $4,994,412 to Ken-
tucky debtors. Hence, Kentucky debtors received thirteen per cent,
or $759,639, less return benefits than their counterparts across the
nation. There is no way to determine how this profit was shared
between the creditor and the insurer, because there are no such
statistics.
Studies have shown that approximately $.30 per $100 indebted-
ness per annum is returned to beneficiaries, 47 premiums charged above
$.30 being divided among administrative costs, taxes, and profits. The
rate offered by creditor groups in Kentucky ranges from $.871/2 per
100 per annum with a loss ratio of 85.1 per cent (General Motors
Acceptance Corporation, to a high of $1.25 per $100 per annum with
a loss ratio of 24.7 per cent (Investor's Heritage Life Insurance
Company, and State Capital Life Insurance Company.) 48 At present,
most credit life insurers in Kentucky are using the $1.00 per $100 per
annum rate on decreasing term insurance.49 Policies may differ in
rates, but offer comparable coverage. However, the debtor is in no
position to shop for the cheapest insurance since he usually has no
real choice of creditors.50 Often it is impossible to compare rates and
coverage offered by diff rent creditors, because the policies are pre-
sented in a complex and ambigious wviy.51
The high rates are caused by a phenomenon, peculiar to credit life
insurance, called reverse competition. Ordinarily, market pressures
force sellers to charge competitive prices for a standardized product
like insurance. However, in the credit life marketplace the buyer is
not free to shop for a lower price since he is required to buy the in-
surance sold by his creditor, regardless of the price. In order to
maximize his profits on the credit transaction, the creditor sells to the
debtor the policy of the insurer who pays the greatest commission or
kickback. The insurer must maintain his normal profit in order to stay
in business while he competes for the creditor's business. Therefore,
46 Id. at 18.
47 H NAIC Paocr. aS 508 (1964); See also Statement of James H. Hunt,
Commissioner of Banking and Insurance of Vermont, delivered to the Senate
Antitrust Subcommittee May, 1967. Hearings Before the Antitrust and Monopoly
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1967)
[hereinafter cited as Hunt's Statement].48 Ky. REFORT 14.
49 From a survey of the rates required to be filed by 3 Ky. ADUfIN. REG.
I-CL&C-4 (1955). However, under his statutory authority the Insurance Com-
missioner has limited the amount small loan companies may charge to $ .75 per
$100 per annum. See KRS § 288.560 (1962) and Ky. REPoRT 11.
Gu See text at notes 32-34 supra. This inequality of bargaining power is the
basis for all interest regulatory statutes.
51 Noted in President Johnson's speech to Congress regarding the Truth-In-
Lending Act of 1967 as reported in U. S. INVEsTOR (April, 1967).
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to withstand the creditor's demand for a greater profit share the
premium is raised.52 The more complete the debtor's captivity, the
higher rate the creditor can charge, and likewise the more profit he
can demand from the insurer. Thus, the real competitive pressure is
between the insurer and the creditor for the profit, with the debtor
exerting no influence.53 Only financially strong and ethical insurance
companies can withstand this reverse competition and charge reason-
able rates.
Although insurers generally make a profit on credit life, some
cannot withstand the profit demands of creditors. South Carolina
found that many insurers, superficially profitable, were in fact and
law insolvent, primarily because huge kickbacks to lenders on group
credit life policies had exhausted their surpluses and lowered their
capital below minimum reserves required by law.54 However, the
creditors who deal with such insurers make such large profits on in-
surance sales that they would suffer no severe economic loss if the
insurer were to fail financially. Any loss of debt collection, due to the
insurer's insolvency, would be absorbed by the past excessive profits
earned by the creditor. The only real losers are the regular life policy
holders of insurers who sell both types of policies. The result of this
abuse is to undercut and destroy public faith in insurance in general.
It has been shown that creditors profit from the tie-in sale of credit
life insurance through commissions and retrospective credits for
favorable group underwriting experience. But why should the enter-
prising creditor be satisfied with only a percentage of this windfall
when he can secure all the profit by owning or controlling the in-
surance company? Such a course is not without difficulty since it is
expensive and time-consuming to establish a company in all the
states in which a creditor might operate, and it also takes a certain
expertise to operate an insurance business, even a specialty credit
life company. However, the same result can be accomplished by
reinsurance.55
52 See H.R. REP. No. 2168, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1962); KEDziE 40, 163-
64; Ky. REP RT 24; Hunt's Statement 6; SouTH CAROLINA REPORT 10, 23. The
regional manager of a national insurance company reported to his home office
that "[un most cases the insurance company is getting a net retention of 10% of
the gross premium ,and allowing their [s] broker to get whatever he can as
additional retention." Statement of Charles W. Ganbrell, Chief Insurance Com-missioner, State of Sou h Carolina. He rings Beore the Antitrust and Monopoly
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciar, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 17
(1967) thereinafter cited as GambrelU' Statement].
53 KAS. HEAIUNGS 4-5; Hunt's Statement 6; Sotu CAROLINA REPORT 22.
54 Sotrrn CARoLIaNA REPORT 21.55 A reinsurance transaction is a transaction in which the company accepting
the risk cedes a part of that risk to another insurance company. In consideration
(Continued on next page)
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In the reinsurance scheme the creditor forms a subsidiary specialty
company in one state, often Arizona because of its minimal capital
and surplus requirements. This company need not apply for per-
mission to do business in any other state. Instead, the creditor, in his
capacity as the Arizona company, enters into a reinsurance contract
with an established company licensed in the other states in which he
does business. This company "fronts" for the real insurer, the Arizona
captive company. The fronting company directly underwrites all the
policies sold by the creditor in that state and reinsures them with the
creditor's subsidiary company. In return, the fronting company
usually receives a service fee, which varies according to the relative
strength of the creditor and fronting insurer, plus any premium tax
due. Typically, the fronting company's only administrative duties are
to record an "in an out" entry in its books, with the creditor and
his captive company handling the other necessary administrative
duties.
Three basic kinds of fronting situations have been found by the
Kentucky Department of Insurance."0 "Territorial fronting," the most
common, operates as described above, i.e., a licensed Kentucky insurer
reinsures with a creditor's captive insurance company licensed only
in another state. "Financial fronting" is employed when the surplus
of the captive company is so limited that it cannot post reserves for
all the business the creditor controls. A fronting company with strong
surplus issues the policy, posts on its records the necessary statutory
reserves to protect the policy, and then assigns the policy to the
captive company. Both companies are licensed in the same state, but
only the issuing or fronting company must post the reserve. This
permits the captive company to receive the profits earned from the
policies without becoming technically insolvent by exceeding reserve
requirements.57 The third fronting situation, "permium tax avoidance,"
is similar to "territorial fronting" and occurs when a domestic insurer,
who pays little or no premium tax, fronts for a foreign insurer, who
under state law would have to pay a higher tax to the domiciliary
state.5 8
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
for the acceptance of the risk, the reinsurer receives a premium from the company
which originally accepted the risk, just as the original company received a pre-
mium from the insured for the acceptance of the same risk. S. Ac rAN, IN-
SuReNCF 707 (3d ed. 1948).
56 Ky. REPoRT 27.5 7 Financial fronting was explained in a letter from American United Life In-
surance Co., a fronting company, to the Kentucky Department of Insurance.
Letter from American United Life Insurance Company to the Kentucky Depart-
ment of Insurance, April 21, 1967.GSThe average state tax on regular life insurance in 1966 was 4.2% of the
total premium dol.
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In a fronting situation, very little profit is taken by the named
insurer, with the bulk of the premium going to the creditor directly
as sales commissions, or indirectly as profits from his subsidiary in-
surance company.59 Thus, the creditor can easily increase his insurance
sales profits by raising his rates, and at the same time he can allocate
his income between himself and his captive insurer in order to secure
the best income tax advantage. He may take no profit as a creditor-
agent, sending all profit instead to the captive insurance company,
which holds it as earned surplus. Later, upon liquidation of the in-
surance company, the creditor will pay only a capital gains tax on the
stock which has swelled in value from lucrative profits received
through credit life sales.
Notwithstanding these financial manipulations, the fronting com-
pany does not care about the harsh terms of the policy or the sub-
sequent poor service given to the policyholder by the subsidiary com-
pany. The fronting company, whose customer is the creditor, is un-
concerned that the debtor relying on its good name is misled.
REtILATON
Little attempt was made to regulate credit life insurance until
after World War II. Then in United States v. Southeastern Under-
writers Association,60 the United States Supreme Court held that in-
surance was interstate commerce subject to federal regulation. How-
ever, since there had traditionally been little or no federal regulation
of insurance, Congress promptly passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act'
The policy of this Act was that the public interest required that the
states be allowed to continue regulating and taxing the business of
insurance. The Act did apply federal antitrust and trade regulation
legislation "to the business of insurance to the extent that such
business is not regulated by State law."62 The courts, however, were
left to determine exactly what regulation by state law entailed.
The states made no concerted effort to regulate credit life insurance
until after the 1953 Senate Antitrust Subcommittee hearings con-
59 Some large insurance companies are professional fronting organizations,
assigning their entire business to creditors' captive insurers. Kentucky has no
statutes or regulations preventing such a practice.
60 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
6115 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1945).
62 Id. at § 1011. "Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said
Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, intimidate or any
act of boycott, coercion, intimidation." Id. at § 1013(b). The Act does not give
insurance companies federal antitrust immunity from price-fixing conspiracies
effectuated by boycott, coercion, or intimidation. California League of Independent
Insurance Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 179 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Cal. 1959).
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cerning credit life insurance sales in Kansas. The Subcommittee, after
finding great abuse in selling practices and rate making, threatened
that the federal government "will not forever accept 'attempts' at
regulation as a substitute for regulation of the business of insurance
by the states. The patience of the Federal Government with those who
would abuose the good name of insurance may come to an end."e
The National Association of Insurance Commissioners, [herein-
after referred to as NAIC] ,64 spurred by the hearings, promulgated
a model credit insurance bill. The Model Bill deals with such abuses
as coercion in selling insurance provided by the creditor, lack of dis-
closure, pyramiding or excessive coverage, and failure to make refunds
of unearned insurance premiums and benefits. 65 Although traditionally
there had never been rate regulation of life insurance,6° the NAIC,
feeling that it was necessary to protect the debtor because of the lack
of bargaining power and reverse competition,67 advocated such
regulation of credit life in 1959. Several methods of rate regulation
were available, but there was no uniform agreement among the
members of the NAIC on which approach was the most desirable.68
It finally adopted a provision for the Model Bill, allowing state in-
surance commissioners to disapprove for sale any policy form in
which the loss payoff benefits were not "reasonable" in relation to the
premiums.69 The Model Bill language was interpreted by various
states who adopted it as giving the commissioner no authority to set
rates per se, but only the power to reject an individual policy rate if
it seemed excessive.70
Because of the varied loss experience of companies in the credit
life field, it was thought difficult to determine a uniform rate which
would produce a "reasonable" rate of return. Claims were made that
there was a lack of credit life actuarial experience by which to
6 3 KANsAs HEAING 14. Subsequent to the hearings Kansas enacted small
loan and sales finance acts and an insurance code for the regulation of certain
tradepr . K. STAT. AmN. § 16-413 (1955); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 16-507
64 The NAIC is a voluntary cooperative organization of state insurance
officials which gives advisory opinions for the regulation of the insurance industry.
65For contents of the Act, see B. CumiAN, TRENw iN CoNstmim CErr
LEGISLATION 330 (1965).
6644 C.J.S. Insurance § 65 (1945).67 Congress also found rate regulation necessary when considering a credit
life bill for the District of Columbia. S. REP. No. 1519, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. 3(1960).6 8 See notes 95, 96, and 97 supra for the various methods.
691 NAIC PRocMnMrNs 128 (1959). This same test was later adopted by
Kentucky in relation to credit life on small loans. KRS § 288.560 (1962).7 0 Letter Opinion from the Attorney General to the Department of In-
surance, dated May 11, 1960.
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accurately determine loss experience.71 In response to te need for
some guideline for rate regulation, the NAIC recommended that "a rate
for credit life... producing a loss ratio of under 50% should be con-
sidered excessive" 72 Using this loss ratio "bench mark," the insurer
must show statistically that at least fifty per cent of its premiums
were returned in claim payments. 73 In other words, if a rate of $.75
per $100 per annum is charged, the insurer must show a claim pay-
ment of at least $.37V2. However, there would appear to be no satis-
factory reason why the purchaser of credit life should pay the ex-
treme rate of fifty per cent of his purchase dollar toward the over-
head and profit of the seller.1 4 Few monopolists can boast of such a
return.
In 1950, following the passage of the McCarran-Ferguson Act,
Kentucky enacted general insurance laws designed to regulate in-
surance trade practices by defining and prohibiting practices con-
stituting unfair methods of competition or deception.75 Rate regulation
was not authorized, however, and the statutes failed to deal with many
of the unique problems of credit life sales. In 1954 and 1955, Ken-
tucky Commissioner of Insurance S. H. Gobbel issued Insurance
Regulations I-CL&C-1 through I-CL&C-8 governing the sale of credit
life. These Regulations included the requirement that rates be filed
with the Commissioner, although they did not authorize him to reject
prospective rates. Due to opposition, legislation proposed in 1958,
which would have allowed the Commissioner to reject rates, was never
introduced in the General Assembly.70 In 1959, Regulation I-CL&C-10,
issued by Commissioner Thurman, stated that a rate was prima facia
reasonable if it produced a loss ratio of not less than fifty per cent on
individual policies and seventy per cent on group policies. In 1960,
however, newly appointed Commissioner Hockensmith issued Regula-
tion I-CL&C-11 which superseded I-CL&C-10. It provided that the
benefits must be reasonable in relation to the premium charged and
that a fifty per cent loss ratio or claim payment for group and
71 There appears no reason why regular life insurance actuarial experience
could not have been used.
72 1 NAIC PocEmEs 176 (1960).
73 Under this test, since the average credit life claim payment is $.30 per
$100 per annum, no premium over $.60 should be charged. Hunt's Statement 19.74 Life Insurance actuaries know that loss ratios can run as high as 80% in
credit insurance and still allow the creditor to receive a modest dividend and
the insurer to make a profit. Aetna Life is a company which achieves such a loss
ratio. Hunt's Statement 20. Of the average life insurance dollar, $.783 goes for
current and future obligations to policy holders, $.096 for office expenses, $.073
for agents' commissions, and $.040 for taxes. INsTrr=r oF Lw INsuBAIcE,
supra note 3, at 52.
75 KRS §§ 304.924-45 (1962).
76 Ky. lBEpoT 7,
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individual coverage was prima facia reasonable. This was the same
test that the NAIC had proposed. Shortly thereafter this regulation
was revoked because the Attorney General issued a ruling that the
Commissioner had no statutory authority to regulate rates.77
No rate regulatory authority has since been given to the Com-
missioner except by the Consumer Loan Act of 1960, which directed
the Commissioner to reject all rates used by the small loan companies
covered by the Act which are not "reasonable in relation to the death
benefit required."78 Pursuant to that authority a bulletin was issued
by the Commissioner proclaiming that $.75 per $100 per annum was
prima facia reasonable.79 That rate is still in effect
Various political pressure groups have consistently prevented
passage of rate regulation legislation in Kentucky for all creditor
groups except small loan companies. However, the record of regula-
tion promulgated does show the efforts of Insurance Commissioners
to exercise such power.80 In 1967, the Insurance Department issued a
report on credit insurance in which it charged that some creditor-
agents were receiving "advance and contingent commissions in excess
of $.75 per $100 per annum . . . which amount in many states is the
maximum premium rate allowed."8' The Report, after stating that the
"overall loss experience record does not speak well of the credit life
and accident and health industry in this State,"82 indicated that the
Department planned to again sponsor the Model Bill. This would
include the provision granting the Commissioner power to reject rates
if the benefits provided are not reasonable in comparison with the
premiums charged.83
If the Kentucky Legislature fails again to enact a credit insurance
bill, the Commissioner may be able to declare that rates exceeding a
specified rate standard amount to "unfair competition" under KRS
304.945, and to maintain that issuance of a desist order by him in
respect thereto would be in the public interest.84 If the Kentucky
Court of Appeals will accept such an interpretation, thus giving the
Commissioner indirect rate regulating authority over all credit life,
excessive profit taking can be controlled. It is doubtful that the
7 7 Letter Opinion from the Attorney General to the Department of Insurance,
dated May 11, 1960.
78KM § 288.560 (1962).
79 Ky. REPoRT 11.
so Id. at 5-9.
81 Id. at 37.
82 Id. at 36.
83Id. at 38.
84KRS § 304.945 (1962) gives the Commissioner power to curtail in the
public interest undefined practices or business conduct which is unfair or
deceptive.
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Court will interpret this statute as giving such authority, however,
since this important power is usually expressly authorized. Securing
a private agreement on a reasonable rate standard from creditor groups
not covered by the Consumer Loan Act might provide an alternate
control.8 5 Such an agreement may, however, be a Kentucky unfair
trade practice resulting in "unreasonable restraint of, or monopoly in,
the business of insurance." 6 Absent the McCarran-Ferguson Act, it
would surely constitute price fixing in violation of the Sherman Act,
which prohibits any conspiracy in restraint of interstate commerce 81
Even under this Act, Senate Antitrust Subcommittee Chairman Hart
has stated, "to the extent that .. .rates .. .are tied to insurance
practices, the antitrust laws apply only when they are not regulated
by the states" s s Thus, if the Kentucky Commissioner is a party to a
rate agreement, some color of state regulation might exist. Such
agreements would give the Commissioner some influence over rates,
if not rate-setting authority.
A national survey shows that thirty-four states currently have some
form of broad credit life insurance law, most of them patterned after
the Model Bill.8 9 Six others, including Kentucky, have similar in-
surance department regulations.m Thirty-three of the states with laws
have one of five forms of rate regulation. The first is the maximum
premium rate standard, which seventeen states have adopted.91 The
rate standard is the easiest rate control to administer because it is
85 Canada uses this procedure with success. Supr aN rr- or INsuR cE
(CANADA), MEMOnANDUM FOR LICENSEE UNumi run SMAL. LoAN Acr. RE
Gnoup INSURANcE ON THE LIVEs or BomnowEus (1959).
86 KRS § 304.926 (1962).8 7 The illegality of price fixing does not depend upon a showing of
reasonableness since it is conclusively presumed to be unreasonable. U. S. v. Mc-
Kesson & Bobbins, Inc., 351 U. S. 305 (1956); U. S. v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co.,
310 U. S. 150 (1940). It matters not that the debtor would benefit from the rate.
Combinations fixing maximum prices are no less subject to the Sherman Act than
those fixing minimum prices. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
340 U.S. 211 (1951). The question to be decided by the current congressional
hearings is whether Public Law 15 is "wise, prudent, and makes good long-term
sense.' WASmNTON INsuRA~c NxwsLwrraa (May, 1967). Congress has said
that it is "the legal sanctions afforded combinations of competitors to set rates in
concert which represent the most serious threat to the naturally competitive
structure of the market." S. REP. No. 831, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1961).88 WASHINGTON INsuRANcE NmvsLE-rnE (May, 1967).89 Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, District of Columbia,
Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, Wisconsin, Wyoming.9 0Alabama, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, North Carolina, Tennessee.91 Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Michigan,
Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Texas. The rates range from $.44 to $.90 per $100 per
annum.
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more exact.92 The insurance department need only prevent insurers
from charging more than the maximum rate. New York and New
Jersey have established rate standards on a decremental scale, de-
creasing with the size of the creditor.93
The second method is the percentage loss ratio "bench mark,"
the NAIC test, which fifteen states have adopted.9 4 Generally fifty per
cent is the accepted loss ratio. However, there is a question of
whether the loss ratio should be determined from each insurer's own
experience or the national experience of all insurers. If it is determined
individually, excessive fragmentation in rates from insurer to insurer
will result. Debtors wil pay different rates for the same coverage
depending on which insurer the creditor uses. The better view is that
the cost should not vary with the individual insurer,95 since there is
sufficient national mortality experience to establish a uniform cost for
credit life.96 The rate then would be objectively determined from data,
uninfluenced by the personal judgment of each commissioner on each
policy.
The third method of rate regulation 7 is a combination of the rate
standard and the "bench mark" loss ratio. A reasonable rate is set,
such as $.75 per $100 per annum, subject to revision upward upon
statistical showing by the insurer of a loss ratio higher than the
"bench mark." This combination provides the simplicity of the rate
standard and the flexibility of the loss ratio. The fourth method,
adopted by one state,98 is to give the insurance commissioner broad
authority to approve all rates. However, most states do not want
such power to reside in a politically controlled appointee. The fifth
method is to place a percentage limitation on creditors' commissions.
This supposedly will prevent creditors' profit demands from pushing
rates upward. This method of control has been effectively circum-
92 Kentucky Commissioner Woodall stated in a personal interview that he
favors a rate standard of $.75 per hundred per annum, the same as required of
small loan companies.93 Recognizing that administrative costs of a group policy decrease with size,
these states have limited their rates to $.64 per $100 per annum for the smallest
creditors, reducing to $.44 per $100 for the largest group policies (over
$5,000,000 average outstanding debt). Hunt's Statement 19.
94 Arizona, California, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, Nevada,
New, Hampshire, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Texas, Washington, West Virginia.
The 'bench mark" may be in conjunction with a rate standard. See note 99 infra.9r Doss, Rate Regulation in Consumer Credit Insurance, 1967 INs. L.J. 9, 24(1967); Dunbar, Administrative Rate Fixing on Credit Life, 14 PEas. FIN. L.Q.
RE. 16 (1959).
96 The underlying mortality cost in credit life averages $.30. Hunt's Statement
19. Approximated at $.28 in VI NAIC PRocEmmiNs 121 (1958); and $.30 in
II NAIC Pnocxznres 508 (1964).9 7 See notes 83 & 87 supra.98 Wisconsin
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vented through the use of captive insurance companies and fronting
situations. 9 By owning a captive insurance company the creditor can
avoid any legal regulation on the amount of commissions he can
make by taking none and profiting later from his insurance company
ownership.
Usury statutes may be another means of regulating credit life
rates. Usury is the intentional taking or reserving, or contracting to
take or reserve, either directly or indirectly, a greater sum for the use
of money than the lawful interest.10 Credit life may be used as an
indirect usurious device because of its tie-in sale with the credit
transaction."" The debtor must receive material and substantial
benefits from the insurance to sustain separate and additional charges
above the legal rate of interest.' 0 2 Security for the debtor would be
such a benefit; but the debtor must desire the security.
An intention to violate the usury law may be inferred by the
courts if the sale of insurance is made as a condition precedent to
extention of credit. Such an inference was made in In re Graham,'03
where an insurance premium of $151.88 for a $4,500 policy was de-
ducted by the creditor from a loan of $451.88. The case held that the
contract for the loan of money and the agreement for insurance
were blended together in one transaction and that the actual con-
sideration realized exceeded the statutory rate of interest. No other
evidence of usurious intent beyond the compulsory purchase of in-
surance was necessary to show a violation of the Kentucky usury
statute. 0 4
An intent to evade laws against usury has also been implied from
the charging of exorbitant insurance premiums, 10 5 the theory being
99 Doss, supra note 95, at 27.100 BLAc's LAw DicnoNAnY 1714 (4th ed. 1951). The elements of usury
are: (1) a loan; (2) the principal to be repaid; (3) the exaction of a greater pro-
fit than that allowed by law; (4) the intention to violate the law. The presence
of these elements establishes usury irrespective of the form in which the parties
put the transaction. 55 Am. JuR., Usury § 12 (1946).301 The creditor may be a policy holder because he has an insurable interest
in the life of the debtor to the extent of the indebtedness. 44 C.J.S. Insurance §
208 (1945). The insurer is only incidentally connected with the credit transaction
so no action for usury will lie against it. Where the credit is extended by an
insurance company which issues its own credit life policy on the debt, the pre-
mium will not be considered as interest for the purpose of finding usury. KBS
§ 360.030 (1962). See 4 A.L.R.8d 650 (1965).
102 KRS § 288.560 (1962) permits insurance charges on small loans.
103 22 F. Supp. 233 (W. D. Ky. 1938).
104The court said "I am of the opinion that the cupidity of lenders and the
necessity of borrowers are so great that the courts should be diligent in searching
and weeding out hidden illegal exactions in contracts of lenders of money." Id. at
237. See also 91 A.L.R.2d 1344 (1963).
105 Cochran v. Alabama, 270 Ala. 440, 119 So. 2d 339 (1960); 91 A.L.R.2d
1340 (1963).
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that the excess premium has no relation to the insurance security, but
rather provides additional compensation for extending credit. Other
factors considered by courts in determining intent to evade usury
statutes are: (1) the retention of a portion of the premium as a com-
mission, or other profit made by means of the insurance; (2) a pre-
mium in excess of the usual or fair rate, or unusual conditions im-
posed in the insurance provision; (3) adequate security for the
credit aside from insurance, or excessive insurance; (4) failure of the
creditor to give the debtor the option to provide his own insurance;
(5) failure of the creditor making an insurance charge to procure a
policy, or failure to pay benefits exceeding the existing debt.Y°6
Although usurious practices may be found in credit life sales, as a
practical matter usury laws offer little protection. The premium is
paid at the time credit is extended. The debtor must initiate court
action to recover the excessive charge, and the burden of proof is on
him to show the creditor's usurious intent.107 The action is at law
unless the debtor can show that only equity can provide adequate
remedy. Moreover, relief from usury varies from state to state. In
Kentucky equitable relief is provided by statute, but recovery is
limited to the excess of the rate charged over the legal rate of
interest. 08 Even if the insurance premium is excessive by $1.00 per
$100 per annum on a three year debt of $1,000, recovery would be
limited to $30. This is hardly worth court action. It is evident that the
traditional usury suit initiated by an individual debtor provides him
little relief.
There have been a few attempts by bankruptcy referees to afford
bankrupt debtors relief from excessive credit life insurance profits.
In In re Richards'09 the bankruptcy referee disallowed a creditor's
claim as usurious because the insurance premium exceeded the
statutory limit placed on insurers. But the district court reversed the
referee's decision, stating that the small loan statute specifically ex-
cludes the cost of credit life as an "interest" charge in excess of per-
mitted charges. There was no showing that the creditor charged
more than that charged by the insurer, and the Legislature had not
made the creditor responsible for an unauthorized charge by the
insurer. In addition, the debtor had not sustained the burden of
100 91 A.L.R.2d 1344, 1348 (1963).
11,7 Paine v. Levy, 142 Ky. 619, 134 S.W. 1160 (1911). See also 91 C.J.S.
Usury § 114 (1955).
10 8 The legal rate of interest in Kentucky is 6%. KRS § 360.010 (1962). The
statute of limitations is one year from the payment of the usurious interest. KIRS
§ 413.140 (1962).
169 [1966-67 Transfer Binder] BANKH. L. R. 62,345 (S. D. Me. 1967).
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proving the charge usurious. In another case, arising in Tennessee,
the court upheld the referee's finding of usury."10 There, the creditor
had pyramided the insurance policies and charges so as to receive
four insurance premiums on the same loan. However, this form of
relief is available only to bankrupts, and therefore is quite limited.
Even if the individual debtor is successful in proving that the
credit life charge is usurious, such a finding will have little effect on
the creditor's subsequent activities. The loss of the usury on one
transaction will not teach him a lesson. An injunction has been issued
in Kentucky to prevent a creditor from charging usurious rates
through requiring the purchase of insurance."' However, the case is
not strong precedent for the control of insurance sales since in arriving
at its decision, the Court seemed more influenced by the fact that
the creditor was operating a small loan business without a state
license.
In devising a scheme of regulation for credit life insurance it must
be recognized that laws which regulate only the creditor are not
sufficient. The Kansas Hearings revealed that:
credit insurance abuses may exist because of unethical practices in-
dulged in by both lending organizations and credit insurance companies.
Where this is the case it may be necessary to enact good state loan laws
side by side with good state credit life insurance laws.1 2
Kentucky presently has no such insurance law.
The investigating subcommittee also found that part of the in-
adequate control existed because agencies vested with the power to
control abusive credit insurance sales were ineffective."13 The Ken-
tucky Department of Insurance has difficulty controlling the abuses
because of its small staff, the difficulty of proof, and lack of adequate
statutory power. The Insurance Department has statutory authority
to examine the affairs and records only of insurance companies." 4 The
only way it can investigate insurance sales records of banks, small
loan companies, and other institutional creditors is to be invited by
the Kentucky Department of Banking to observe its investigation."15
However, the Banking Department, under pressure by creditors to
prevent such an invitation, is often reluctant to cooperate with the
Insurance Department. Therefore there is no effective means by
110 1n Re Branch, [1966-67 Transfer Binder] Ba~sm. L.R. 9l 61,943 (Tenn.
1966). See In re Graham, 22 F. Supp. 233 (D. C. Ky. 1938).
111 Grauman v. Continental Co. Inc., 275 Ky. 238, 121 S.W.2d 49 (1938).
112 KYASAS HRuNGS 2.
I's Id. at 9.
114KRS § 304.030 (1962).
"5 KRS § 287.450 (1962). The duty of the bank examiner is to see that
the laws of this state have been complied with. KRS § 287.60 (1962).
[Vol. 56,
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vhich to police credit life sales. The Insurance Commissioner is him-
self a political appointee," 6 selected by the Governor to serve with-
out a specified term. Neither his appointment nor his dismissal is con-
firmed by the Legislature, and he may be dismissed without cause.
The office is therefore highly susceptible to political pressure.
CONCLUSION
The principle of credit life insurance is highly desirable because
of the security it affords creditors and debtors. However, as we have
seen, the sale of such insurance in Kentucky and other states is
greatly abused. Various selling practices are used by creditors to
violate existing statutes and regulations, with the high rate of profit
to be gained as an incentive. Because of the debtor's "captivity" and
the phenomenon of reverse competition, rates are forced up by un-
ethical creditors seeking unconscionable profits on their credit trans-
actions. Although some restraint is exercised by ethical creditors and
insurers who are concerned about their public image, economic pres-
sures to compete force their participation in taking high profits. The
Kentucky Department of Insurance presently has no effective means
of controlling abusive selling practices and rates. Moreover, general
usury law is not an effective deterrent, although credit life insurance is
suspected of being a vehicle for circumventing usury statutes. Pro-
tection of the helpless debtor, the policy behind all credit transaction
regulation, demands adequate governmental regulation of credit life
insurance.
The vast majority of knowledgable observers feel rate control is
the only effective means of removing high sales profits. Indeed, there
is some question whether the debtor should pay premiums at all since
the creditor is the primary beneficiary of the policy. This is especially
true when the creditor makes an unconscionable profit from the in-
surance sale, for after all, security is the professed purpose, not profit.
If Senator Hart is correct in suggesting that absent some form of rate
regulation by the states, there is no state regulation within the
meaning of the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 17 the Federal Trade Com-
mission or the Justice Department have the power to regulate under
current federal laws. Indeed, insurance readily lends itself to federal
regulation because of the desirability of universal rate control and
enforcement.
However, federal regulation may neither be the fastest nor the
116KRS § 12.040 (1962).11 7 WAS GTON INsuRANc NEWSLmr (May, 1967).
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most desirable relief. Kentucky needs to take immediate steps to pass
statutory rate regulation of all credit insurance. Such regulation
should limit the sales profits to that earned on the sale of regular
life insurance, the legislation providing either a rate standard or
"bench mark" ratio. A less desirable rate control would be one
similar to that regarding tie-in sales with small loans, which allows
the Insurance Commissioner to reject rates not "reasonable" in re-
lation to the benefit. However, where the Commissioner's discretion
may be exercised regarding rate setting, the public's interest may be
suppressed in favor of strong creditor pressure. There has never been
rate control of credit life insurance in Kentucky, but because of the
public interest, it is now desirable and necessary. If creditors and
insurers are not abusing rates, they would have no reason to oppose
reasonable rate regulation of credit life insurance.
J. Alan Lips
